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I. INTRODUCTION 
This essay is about change in the common law.  More exactly, 
it is about how a principle of common-law contracts known as the 
“at-will rule” was redefined by the Minnesota Supreme Court in 
1983 in a case known as Pine River State Bank v. Mettille.1  That ruling 
 
       †       Lawyer (retired), Minneapolis, Minnesota.  B.A., University of 
Minnesota, 1964, LL.B., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1967.  Mr. Hedin 
is a Fellow of the College of Labor and Employment Lawyers, and a co-founder of 
the Minnesota Chapter of the National Employment Lawyers Association.  His 
email address is dhedin@hotmail.com.  This article is dedicated to Andrea 
Fichman Rubenstein, who also was present during the creation. 
 1. 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983). 
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changed the law of employment relations in Minnesota, it 
influenced many other state supreme courts as they too faced 
challenges to make archaic common-law principles more 
compatible with a modern industrial economy, and it helped bring 
about the birth of a new legal discipline, now known as 
employment law.  This essay describes and explains Pine River’s 
influence, primarily through a history of its citations. 
II. THE LAW OF “MASTER AND SERVANT” ON THE EVE OF PINE RIVER 
When West Publishing Company introduced its “Key-Number 
System” in 1908, it placed court rulings in categories ranging from 
“Abandoned and Lost Property” to “Zoning and Planning.”2  West 
classified litigation between employees and their employers under 
the heading “Master and Servant,” and this accurately described 
the small body of law for most of the last century.  It heavily favored 
the master. 
In his famous address, The Path of the Law, Justice Holmes 
observed: 
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law 
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.  It is 
still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid 
down have vanished long since, and the rule simply 
persists from blind imitation of the past.3 
Though Holmes made these caustic remarks in 1897, he might 
well have been writing about the “at-will rule of law” as it stood for 
most of the next century.4  According to this rule, either the 
employer or the employee is free to quit their relationship at any 
time and for any reason.  The rule is so short, simple, and clear that 
for generations courts repeated it without appending a history of its 
origins or attempting to explain its pertinence to contemporary 
industrial relations.  But it is in the nature of academicians to 
accept, if not welcome, Holmes’s challenge to reexamine and not 
 
 2. WILLIAM W. MARVIN, WEST PUBLISHING COMPANY: ORIGIN, GROWTH, 
LEADERSHIP 79 (1969). 
 3. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 
167, 187 (1920).  Holmes, then serving on the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, delivered this address at the dedication of a hall at Boston 
University School of Law on January 8, 1897.  Id. at 167. 
 4. In his address, Holmes made it clear that he was speaking of a particular 
obsolete doctrine: “I am thinking of the technical rule as to trespass ab initio, as it 
is called, which I attempted to explain in a recent Massachusetts case.”  Id. at 187 
(citing Commonwealth v. Rubin, 43 N.E. 200 (Mass. 1896)). 
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss1/6
7. HEDIN - RC - REFORMAT 3.DOC 11/20/2006  3:27:34 PM 
2006] PINE RIVER STATE BANK V. METTILLE  299 
just repeat the common-law principles that judges and lawyers 
apply.  Accordingly, beginning in the tumultuous 1960s, scholars 
began to explore the origins of the rule to see if it realistically 
described the status of non-union employees in a modern 
economy.  One of the first and most influential of these scholarly 
endeavors appeared in 1967, when Professor Lawrence E. Blades 
published an article advocating relaxation of the at-will rule by 
giving employees a tort remedy for what he termed “abusive 
discharge.”5 
Professor Blades’s article was published three years after the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Such anti-discrimination 
legislation, which restricted employers’ freedom to discharge, was 
noted by state courts when they subsequently faced challenges to 
the common law at-will rule.  Moreover, as implemented by the 
Supreme Court, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act had the 
unintended effect of accelerating erosion of the rule.  In the 
familiar McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green6 three-part burden-shifting 
paradigm, the employee first makes out a prima facie case of 
discrimination, which is followed by the employer’s answer, and 
concluded by the employee’s rebuttal.7  Because a prima facie case 
is relatively easy to prove,8 the employer usually is required to 
explain or justify the action being challenged (typically discharge), 
and those reasons must be both “legitimate” and 
“nondiscriminatory.”9  As a practical matter, therefore, an 
employer, facing the second step of the McDonnell Douglas test, 
cannot risk resting on the at-will rule (i.e., “we were free to fire the 
plaintiff without prior notice and for no reason at all, and that’s 
exactly what we did”).10 
Long before this, many companies had adopted policies 
setting forth the terms, conditions, and benefits of employment.  
 
 5. Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting 
the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1413 (1967).  Blades 
was an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Kansas when he wrote this 
article.  Id. at 1404. 
 6. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 7. Id. at 802–04. 
 8. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (“The 
burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.”). 
 9. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. 
 10. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258 (“[A]lthough the defendant does not bear a 
formal burden of persuasion, the defendant nevertheless retains an incentive to 
persuade the trier of fact that the employment decision was lawful.  Thus, the 
defendant normally will attempt to prove the factual basis for its explanation.”). 
3
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While there were sound business reasons for their original 
adoption, the civil rights laws and subsequent deluge of litigation 
gave them a new importance—by establishing and following 
standard operating procedures, typically placed in manuals for 
their employees and managers, employers could minimize the 
chance that illicit bias would motivate a particular decision on 
hiring, promotion, or discharge.  One purpose of these rules, 
therefore, was to instill in the workforce the belief that they would 
be enforced uniformly, not selectively.  Subsequent court rulings 
relaxing the at-will rule noticed this goal of equality of treatment,11 
and they support one thesis of this essay—while the roots of 
employment law are many, the deepest lie in the civil rights 
movement, not in the organized labor movement.12 
 
 11. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 894–95, 
897 (Mich. 1980) (“Employers can make known to their employees that personnel 
policies are subject to unilateral changes by the employer.  Employees would then 
have no legitimate expectation that any particular policy will continue in force.  
Employees could, however, legitimately expect that policies in force at any given 
time will be uniformly applied to all. . . .  An employer who only selectively 
enforces rules or policies may not rely on the principle that a breach of a rule is a 
breach of the contract, there being in practice no real rule.  An employee 
discharged for violating a selectively enforced rule or policy would be permitted to 
have the jury access whether his violation of the rule or policy amounted to good 
cause.  Rules and policies uniformly applied are, however, as much a part of the 
‘common law of the job’ and a part of the employment contract as a promise [in a 
handbook] to discharge only for cause.”); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 
491 A.2d  1257, 1269 (N.J. 1985), modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985) (“Here the 
question of good cause is made considerably easier to deal with in view of the fact 
that the agreement applies to the entire workforce, and the workforce itself is 
rather large.  Even-handedness and equality of treatment will make the issue in 
most cases far from complex . . . .”).  In this embryonic stage of wrongful discharge 
law, one court adopted a theory of liability that was influenced by the prohibition 
against sex discrimination in civil rights legislation.  In Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 
316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974), the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that a female 
employee who was fired for refusing to date her supervisor stated a common law 
claim for malicious discharge.  Only a few years later, those facts would give rise to 
a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment under state and federal anti-
discrimination laws. 
 12. Nevertheless, the influence of the labor movement on the employee 
rights movement is apparent.  For example, the “just cause” standard in collective 
bargaining agreements is identical to provisions in personnel manuals which state 
supreme courts construed to relax the at-will rule in the 1980s.  Borrowing a 
critical feature of labor contracts, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded its 
ruling in Toussaint with the suggestion that non-union employers adopt a policy of 
“binding arbitration” on “cause and damages” to extract themselves from what it 
called the “perils” of the jury system.  292 N.W.2d at 897.  There is an enormous 
amount of literature on whether it is advisable for employers to force non-union 
employees to arbitrate employment-related claims, as suggested by the Michigan 
4
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During these times, there were scattered signs of unease about 
the at-will rule in the states.  In 1959, the California Court of 
Appeal held that a worker who was fired because he refused his 
employer’s order to commit perjury before a legislative committee 
stated a claim for wrongful dismissal—the first of what became 
known as the “public policy exception” to the at-will rule.13  In the 
next two decades, there was a trickle of state court rulings 
recognizing employee wrongful discharge suits, usually in 
particularly egregious situations.14  In 1980, in Touissant v. Blue Cross 
& Blue Shield of Michigan, 15 the Michigan Supreme Court upheld 
jury verdicts in favor of non-union employees who were discharged 
in violation of “just cause” provisions in personnel manuals issued 
by their employers.16  Two years later, in Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, 
Inc.,17 New York’s highest court issued a similar ruling.18 
There were parallel developments in constitutional law.  In 
1968, in Pickering v. Board of Education, 19 the United States Supreme 
Court held that a public employee who expressed his views about 
important public issues was protected from reprisal by his employer 
by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.20  Four years 
 
Supreme Court; however, the movement has not made much headway.  One 
reason is that federal courts (and arbitrators) have ruled that the common law at-
will rule is abrogated by a contractual clause mandating arbitration—in other 
words, the arbitration clause implies a just cause standard for dismissal.  
PaineWebber, Inc. v. Agron, 49 F.3d 347, 352 (8th Cir. 1995); Shearson Hayden 
Stone, Inc.  v. Liang, 653 F.2d 310, 312–13 (7th Cir. 1981). 
 13. Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).  
This case is thought to be the beginning of the employee rights movement, but at 
the time it likely was motivated by considerations of intra-governmental relations—
the judiciary wanted to preserve the integrity of proceedings before the legislative 
branch. 
 14. Several of these cases were logical extensions of Petermann.  E.g. Tameny v. 
Atl. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (employee fired after refusing to 
participate in illegal price-fixing scheme stated claim for retaliatory discharge); 
Frampton v. Cent. Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973) (employee fired for 
applying for workers’ compensation benefits had claim for retaliatory discharge). 
 15. 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980). 
 16. Id. at 885. 
 17. 443 N.E.2d 441 (N.Y. 1982). 
 18. Id. at 445 (“[A]n agreement on the part of an employer not to dismiss an 
employee except for ‘good and sufficient cause only’ and, if such cause was given, 
until the prescribed procedures to rehabilitate had failed, does not create an 
ineluctable employment at will.”). 
 19. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 20. Id. at 574.  This was followed by Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) 
(absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate 
forum in which to review the termination of a public employee speaking not as a 
5
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later, in Perry v. Sindermann, the Court held that a state college’s 
faculty guide gave a teacher who had served under ten one-year 
contracts a property right to continued employment that could not 
be taken away without the due process guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.21 
In Minnesota, at the beginning of the 1980s, the at-will rule 
was, seemingly, rock-solid substantive law.  The leading case was 
Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co.,22 where the state supreme court 
rejected a contract claim by a professional engineer who accepted a  
promise of “permanent employment” by a paper company, turned 
down another job offer, closed his business, moved from 
Minneapolis to Grand Rapids where he bought a house, and was 
fired two years later.23  The ruling was issued in 1936, when courts 
were loath to place additional economic burdens on struggling 
enterprises.  Decades later, in the early 1960s, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court twice rejected suits by employees alleging that they 
were fired in breach of the provisions of their employers’ personnel 
manuals.24  Subsequently, it ruled in favor of employees in two 
unusual cases.  In Bussard v. College of Saint Thomas, 25 the court held 
that a priest’s gift of stock in a publisher of a religious magazine, 
worth $350,000, constituted “additional consideration” for 
“permanent employment” by the recipient, a college—which 
simply meant that he could be discharged only for good cause.26  
The court went behind labels, which figure predominately in this 
area of law, and examined Rev. Bussard’s “unique” circumstances.27  
And in Grouse v. Group Health Plan,28 the court imprinted a 
 
citizen upon matters of public concern, but as an employee upon matters only of 
personal interest) and Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 681 (1994) (“An employee 
who makes an unprotected statement is not immunized from discipline by the fact 
that this statement is surrounded by protected statements.”). 
 21. 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).  The Supreme Court decided a companion case 
the same day.  Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (holding that the 
professor had no protected interest in continued employment because he had 
completed his contracted-for term and, therefore, was not protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 22. 197 Minn. 291, 266 N.W. 872 (1936) (Olson,  J.). 
 23. Id. at 294–95, 266 N.W. at 874. 
 24. Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 263 Minn. 520, 537, 117 N.W.2d 213, 224 
(1962) (Rogosheske, J.); Degen v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 260 Minn. 424, 
428–30, 110 N.W.2d 863, 866–67 (1961) (Thomas Gallagher, J.). 
 25. 294 Minn. 215, 200 N.W.2d 155 (1972) (Peterson, J.). 
 26. Id. at 228, 200 N.W.2d at 163. 
 27. Id. at 225–26, 200 N.W.2d at 162. 
 28. 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981) (Otis, J.). 
6
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promissory estoppel analysis on the familiar “lure away” scenario to 
give the plaintiff a cause of action against a company that broke a 
promise to him of new employment.29  To Group Health’s 
argument that under the at-will rule, it could have fired Grouse on 
his first day of work, the supreme court disagreed and held that it 
was required to give him a “good faith opportunity to show he 
could perform his duties.”30 
III. THE REPUTATION OF THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ON THE 
EVE OF PINE RIVER 
Whether a particular court ruling becomes influential depends 
in part on whether that court is well regarded by its peers.  The 
decision of a state court with a high reputation is likely to be cited 
more frequently by other state courts.31  A ruling by a prestigious 
court may be cited by other courts because it is persuasive and 
helps explain why the citing court reached the conclusion it did, or 
that court may merely cite the ruling of another to justify or 
“legitimate” its own decision in a developing area of law.32 
In 1983, on the eve of Pine River, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court was one of the nation’s elite courts.  In one widely cited 
academic study of the “prestige” of state supreme courts published 
that year, Minnesota’s ranked eleventh.33  It also had a reputation 
 
 29. Id. at 116.  Grouse quit a pharmacist position he held at Richter Drug 
after accepting a job offer from Group Health, which withdrew it before he could 
start work, leaving him jobless.  Id. at 115–16.  Grouse’s two-count suit against 
Group Health alleged breach of contract and negligence.  See Appellant’s Brief 
and Appendix at A-3–A-6, Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 
(Minn. 1981) (No. 51128). The supreme court, on its own, imposed a promissory 
estoppel theory of liability on Grouse’s suit.  Grouse, 306 N.W.2d at 116.  A decade 
later, it did this again in a celebrated case, which lead to an unexpected result.  See 
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990) (Simonett, J.), rev’d, 
501 U.S. 663 (1991), on remand, 479 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1992) (Simonett, J.). 
 30. Grouse, 306 N.W.2d at 116. 
 31. David J. Walsh, On the Meaning and Patterns of Legal Citations: Evidence from 
State Wrongful Discharge Precedent Cases, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 337, 340 (1997) 
(“Courts intent on legitimation can be expected to cite prestigious courts most 
often, regardless of the substance of those elite courts’ decisions.  Ultimately, the 
sheer number of citations and prestige of cited courts may be more important 
from the standpoint of legitimation than any close correspondence between the 
holdings of the cited and citing courts.”). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Gregory A. Caldeira, On the Reputation of State Courts, 5 POL. BEHAV. 83, 89 
(1983). Caldeira’s methodology was quite simple.  He counted the number of 
citations each of the state supreme courts made in 1975.  The percentage of this 
total of each supreme court was then computed.  He then created an “expected 
7
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as an “activist” court.  In a study of post-World War II innovation in 
tort law by state supreme courts, Minnesota and New Hampshire 
tied for tenth.34 
A court ruling may also have influence if its author is well 
regarded by other jurists and in the legal community at large.35  In 
1983, Associate Justice John E. Simonett, the author of Pine River, 
had yet to make his reputation as a judge.  He had served on the 
court less than three years—too brief a time to establish a 
reputation.36  By the time of his departure from the court in 1994, 
however, he was regarded by the bar—and likely will be by future 
legal historians—as one of this state’s greatest jurists.37  Pine River is 
one of the foundation blocks of his high stature. 
IV. THE COMPETITION 
In business, a product that reaches the marketplace first 
 
score” for each supreme court, that is, “the percentage of references it should 
have received if judges were inserting citations on a random basis.”  Id. at 88.  
Using this as a “baseline,” he subtracted the expected from the actual percentage 
of references for each court, which yielded positive and negative deviations.  “This 
number, then, serves as the dependent phenomena—judicial reputation.”  Id. at 
92.  In two earlier studies of state supreme court reputation or “prestige,” 
Minnesota ranked twelfth in 1920 and eighth in 1936.  See id.; Rodney L. Mott, 
Judicial Influence, 30 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 205, 314 (1936). 
  However, in another more subjective survey published in 1973 that rated 
entire state court systems on their “legal professionalism” (defined to include their 
methods of judicial selection, structure, administrative apparatus, terms of office, 
and compensation), Minnesota’s  came in at the midpoint.  HENRY R. GLICK & 
KENNETH N. VINES, STATE COURT SYSTEMS 12 (Prentice-Hill 1973).  Idaho, 
Minnesota, and Oklahoma received composite scores of twelve, placing them at 
numbers twenty-two through twenty-four among the fifty state court systems.  Id.  
California ranked first with a composite score of 21.7, and Mississippi was last with 
3.4.  Id. 
 34. Lawrence Baum & Bradley C. Canon, State Supreme Courts as Activists: New 
Doctrines in the Law of Torts, in STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS IN THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 83, 98 (Mary Cornelia Porter & G. Alan Tarr, eds., 1982).  The 
rankings were based on how many of fourteen “innovations” in tort doctrine were 
adopted by a particular court.  Id.  The innovations included limitations on 
sovereign immunity, reform of products liability rules, family-related issues such as 
abrogation of interspousal and parent-child immunities, and the right of privacy, 
among others.  Id. (charting innovative techniques discussed in the chapter).  The 
states ranked at the top were New Jersey, Michigan, Kentucky, and California.  Id.  
 35. See generally, David Klein & Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence of 
Individual Judges on the U. S. Courts of Appeals, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 371 (1999). 
 36. Simonett was appointed by Governor Albert Quie in 1980.  Donna 
Halvorsen, John Simonett’s Legacy is One of High Wit and Deep Wisdom, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), June 6, 1994, at 1B. 
 37. Simonett resigned in 1994.  Id. 
8
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benefits from its novelty.  It can build a base of loyal customers 
before competition arrives.  Similarly, in law, a “leading case” is 
frequently the first—but not always.  Occasionally that first court, 
while recognizing that the conditions which called a common-law 
doctrine into being cease to exist, struggles to forge a new 
approach to the problem.  The next court may rework that initial 
ruling to create a more practical resolution, one that persuades the 
courts of other states.  In the early 1980s, there were three products 
vying for leadership in the swiftly changing field of employment 
contract law—Toussaint, Weiner, and Pine River.38 
Of the three, the Toussaint decision came first—but it was not 
the first state supreme court ruling holding an employer liable for 
breaking promises in its handbook.  Four months before Toussaint, 
the New Mexico Supreme Court, in an opinion of only six 
paragraphs, held that the termination procedures in an employer’s 
policy guide were an implied employment contract.39  It went 
unnoticed.  In contrast, Toussaint was a struggle that caught the 
attention of commentators and courts when it was finished.  The 
first indication of this is the notation on the first page of the 
published decision, which states that the Michigan Supreme Court 
heard arguments on December 5, 1978 and issued its decision on 
June 10, 1980, a remarkably long gestation period for a court 
ruling.40  The court was badly fractured.  In search of authority, 
both the majority and dissent dug deeply into moss-covered 
nineteenth century “master and servant” law.  Each side dissected 
ad nauseam a Depression-era case that concerned a claim for 
“permanent employment” not unlike Skagerberg.41  Pulling out all 
the stops, the majority quoted Perry v. Sindermann,42 while the 
 
 38. There were a scattering of similar rulings, but none had the influence of 
this trio. 
 39. Forrester v. Parker, 606 P.2d 191, 192 (N.M. 1980). 
 40. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 880 
(Mich. 1980).  Two cases were consolidated on appeal in Toussaint, Charles 
Toussaint’s suit against Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan and Walter Ebling’s 
suit against Masco Corporation.  Both men won jury trials.  The Michigan appeals 
court reversed Toussaint, but affirmed Ebling.  Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield of Mich., 262 N.W.2d 848, 853 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977); Ebling v. Masco 
Corp., 261 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).  A four-member majority of the 
Michigan Supreme Court reversed the appeals court in Toussaint, reinstating the 
jury verdict, and it affirmed Ebling.  292 N.W.2d at 883.  Three other members of 
that court concurred in Ebling, but dissented in Toussaint.  292 N.W.2d at 880. 
 41. Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 273 N.W. 315 (Mich. 1937). 
 42. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 894 (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 
601–03 (1972)). 
9
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dissent turned to Thomas M. Cooley, a state supreme court justice 
and noted treatise writer in the Gilded Age.43  When the majority 
emerged from these meanderings, it stated its holdings: 
1) a provision of an employment contract providing that 
an employee shall not be discharged except for cause is 
legally enforceable although the contract is not for a 
definite term—the term is “indefinite,” and 
2) such a provision may become part of the contract 
either by express agreement, oral or written, or as a result 
of an employee’s legitimate expectations grounded in an 
employer’s policy statements.44 
The court later described how an employee’s “legitimate 
expectations” might arise, but in doing so, it disregarded the fact 
that the employees in Toussaint received promises that they would 
not be discharged without cause before they started work: 
No pre-employment negotiations need take place and the 
parties’ minds need not meet on the subject; nor does it 
matter that the employee knows nothing of the particulars 
of the employer’s policies and practices or that the 
employer may change them unilaterally.  It is enough that 
the employer chooses, presumably in its own interest, to 
create an environment in which the employee believes 
that, whatever the personnel policies and practices, they 
are established and official at any given time, purport to 
be fair, and are applied consistently and uniformly to each 
employee.  The employer has then created a situation 
“instinct with an obligation.”45 
In the following years, this expansive dictum attracted some courts 
and troubled others. 
The next case, Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., seems to have had 
the least influence on other state courts.  The reason lies in its facts 
and the narrow body of case law it cited.  Weiner, already working 
at another publishing company, was approached by McGraw-Hill to 
 
 43. Id. at 907.  Cooley served on the Michigan Supreme Court from 1864 to 
1885.  The standard works on Cooley are CLYDE E. JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE 
COURTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THOMAS M. COOLEY, CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, AND 
JOHN F. DILLON UPON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1954) and ALAN R. JONES, 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSERVATISM OF THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY: A STUDY IN THE 
HISTORY OF IDEAS (1987) (publication of 1960 Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Michigan).  A recent study of Cooley appears in PAUL D. CARRINGTON, STEWARDS OF 
DEMOCRACY: LAW AS A PUBLIC PROFESSION (1999). 
 44. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 885. 
 45. Id. at 892 (citations omitted). 
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join it; to make its offer more attractive, McGraw-Hill assured him 
that he would not be terminated without “just cause.”46  The 
company’s handbook promised that as well.47  After eight years of 
employment, Weiner was suddenly cashiered, triggering his suit for 
breach of contract.48  McGraw-Hill’s motion to dismiss on the 
pleadings was denied and an appeal taken.49  Construing the facts 
most favorably to Weiner, the non-moving party, a majority of the 
New York Court of Appeals held that he stated a claim and 
remanded his case for trial.50 
The pre-hiring negotiations between the litigants permitted 
other state supreme courts to view Weiner as a unique, fact-bound 
case.  The majority in Weiner relegated Toussaint and several foreign 
cases to a footnote and referred dismissively to their “less than 
conventional theories” of contract law.51  Aside from these citations 
and a few to professional articles, both the majority and dissent in 
Weiner relied entirely on New York precedent to reach their 
conclusions.  Stylistically, the majority’s opinion was taut and highly 
polished—the converse of Toussaint. 
Weiner differed from Toussaint in another important respect—
it gave a thumbnail sketch of the history of the at-will rule: 
[B]y way of background, it is of interest to observe that 
the at-will employment rule, which originated centuries 
ago as an adjunct to the law of master and servant in 
England, in later times was to find a receptive legal 
environment in laissez-faire nineteenth century America.  
So strong indeed was the turn-of-the-century legal and 
socioeconomic philosophy that nurtured it that for long 
Federal constitutional law deferred to it as well.  But, 
significantly, starting approximately in the days of the 
Great Depression in the early nineteen thirties and 
continuing through the present, though political, 
scholarly and industrial agitation for modification of the 
rule to provide greater job security has been insistent, 
there is growing support for remedial legislat[ion].52 
 
 46. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 442 (N.Y. 1982). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 443. 
 49.  Id. 
 50. Id. at 446. 
 51. Id. at 443 n.3, 446 n.7. 
 52. Id. at 443–44 (citations omitted).  When courts such as Weiner traced the 
origins of the at-will rule and reexamined it in the context of late twentieth 
century workplace relations, they were able to do so without using stilted and 
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Outside New York, Weiner occasionally appears in string cites 
by other courts, yet it is rarely quoted.  Its explanation of the 
origins of the at-will rule—particularly coupling it to discredited 
Lochner-era constitutionalism—may have encouraged the courts of 
sister states to relax the at-will rule.  However, its importance comes 
from the fact that it reached the same conclusion as Toussaint and 
Pine River.  If the Court of Appeals of New York—one of the most 
prestigious and influential state courts—had dismissed Weiner’s 
suit, the development of employment law in this country would 
have been much different. 
Of the first major state supreme court decisions holding that 
an employer’s personnel policies can modify the common law at-
will relationship, Pine River came last, and it became the most 
influential. 
V. THE LITIGANTS, THE JUDGE, THE TRIAL 
When remanding a suit involving a “sharp bid” in a sealed 
auction for the ownership of a newspaper in 1980, Simonett 
concluded his opinion for a unanimous court with a detached 
observation: “At trial, the legal theories and issues may develop 
differently.  Whether a party is likely to prevail at trial is not a 
consideration here.”53  He could not make such a statement in Pine 
River because it had already been tried by a jury.  If it had been 
appealed from a judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, 
or a directed verdict, he would have written differently, and his 
opinion would not have had the influence it did. 
It started as a run-of-the-mill collection case.  Richard Mettille 
took out several real estate and personal loans during the twenty-
one months he worked as a loan officer at the Pine River State 
Bank. 54  When an auditor found deficiencies in his paperwork, the 
bank fired him.55 After he refused to repay the loans, the bank sued 
him in Cass County District Court. 56  It is the nature of collection 
 
politically charged terms such as “labor” and “capital,” which were current in the 
Populist, Progressive, and New Deal periods.  This change in discourse was due, in 
part, to the ideals and the spirit of 1960s Civil Rights legislation and the Civil 
Rights era in general. 
 53. Short v. Sun Newspapers, Inc., 300 N.W.2d 781, 790 (Minn. 1980) 
(citation omitted). 
 54. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 624–25 (Minn. 1983). 
 55.  Id. 
 56. Id. at 625. 
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litigation that the debtor seeks some leverage to bargain with the 
lender.  Mettille’s lawyer, aware of Toussaint, sought refuge in a 
handbook that was issued to his client a few weeks after he began 
work.  He brought a two-count counterclaim against the bank: first, 
breach of contract57—the contract being the handbook—and 
second, a tort claim that the “Bank’s conduct was so grossly 
negligent and wrongful and was further intentional, causing 
Mettille to suffer personal humiliation and defamation of his credit 
and his family’s credit.”58 
The case was assigned to the docket of Judge John Spellacy, 
sitting in Grand Rapids.  Before his appointment to the district 
court in 1974, Spellacy had been a trial lawyer for a quarter 
century, and insurance companies seem to have been an important 
part of his clientele; he was fifty-six years old when he presided over 
Pine River.59 
The case was tried to a jury in January 1982; before trial, 
Spellacy dismissed Mettille’s mishmash tort claim.60  He directed a 
verdict for the bank on its claims and offset the jury’s verdict in 
favor of Mettille by that amount, leaving the latter with a judgment 
of $24,141.07.61  He denied both parties’ motions for a new trial 
and attached an eight-page memorandum explaining his 
reasoning.62  Spellacy’s memorandum, though unusually self-
revelatory, even provocative, was an important chapter in this 
litigation: 
I conceded from the start that in following the recent case 
of the Michigan Supreme Court, Toussaint v. Blue Cross 
(1980), 408 Mich. 579, 292 NW2d 880, I was going well 
beyond existing Minnesota employment contract law.  
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix at A-6, Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 
333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983) (No. 82-543). 
 59. Spellacy’s “official” biography reads: “John A. Spellacy, Grand Rapids.  
Born February 3, 1925, Hibbing; education: University of Minnesota (LL.B., J.D.); 
Lt. (jg.), U.S. Navy (World War II); twenty-five years as a practicing lawyer, 
primarily trial work; member: Int’l Academy of Trial Judges, Order of the Colif 
[sic]; fellow, Int’l Society of Barristers; American Board of Trial Advocates; Ass’n 
of Insurance Attorneys; Int’l Ass’n of Insurance Counsel; board of governors, 
Minnesota State Bar Ass’n; past pres., Itasca County and Fifteenth District Bar 
Assns.; chief judge, Ninth Judicial District; married; four children.  Appointed 
March 1, 1974, elected 1976.”  JOAN ANDERSON GROWE, MINNESOTA SECRETARY OF 
STATE, MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 367 (1981–1982). 
 60.  Appellant’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 58, at A-25. 
 61. Id. at A-22, A-25. 
 62. Id. at A-22. 
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One of the pure thrills enjoyed by a trial Judge is the 
opportunity to aid in the orderly development and 
progression of the law.  The present Minnesota Supreme 
Court, to its credit, has never been accused of adamantly 
refusing to discard outmoded past precedent.  . . .  I admit 
that the rule I’ve applied is contrary to the cases relied 
upon by the plaintiff: Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 197 
Mn. 291, 266 NW 872; Degen v. Investors Diversified Services, 
Inc., 260 Mn. 424, 110 NW2d 863; Cederstrand v. Lutheran 
Brotherhood, 263 Mn. 520, 1117 NW2d 213; Lundeen v. Cozy 
Cab Mfg., 288 Mn. 78, 179 NW2d 73.  Any attempt to 
harmonize these cases is an exercise in futility.  However, 
Cederstrand contains some interesting observations by 
Justice Rogesheske, by all odds one of the members of the 
Court renowned for his compassion.63 
After quoting dicta from Cederstrand, which he described as “a 
lengthy, 17 page struggle to uphold precedent,”64 Spellacy 
continued: 
I further concede that Bussard v. College of St. Thomas, 294 
Mn. 215, 200 NW2d 155, and Grouse v. Group Health Plan, 
Inc., (Mn. 1981) 306 NW2d 114, while decided in favor of 
the employees, are distinguishable in that the employees 
furnished express, new consideration in exchange for job 
security.  Indeed, the language in Grouse is not nearly as 
supportive as Justice Rogesheske’s in Cederstrand.65 
And he concluded on a highly personal note, one that reminds 
us that the fellowship of the bench is small and intimate: 
I strongly suspect that Justice Rogesheske would have 
enjoyed the fact situation in Toussaint and in the case 
before me so that he could, indeed, find an enforceable, 
unilateral modification of a non-union employee’s 
contract so as to permit a fact finder to award damages for 
wrongful termination.  That is all I have done.66 
 
 63.  Id. at A-26. 
 64.  Id. at A-27. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at A-30 (emphasis in original).  We do not know whether Justice 
Rogesheske would have followed the path Spellacy blazed in his memorandum, 
but we do know that his replacement did.  Walter Rogesheske served as associate 
justice from 1962 to 1980, when he resigned.  He was replaced by John Simonett.  
They both came from Little Falls.  Realizing these relationships brings to mind 
Simonett’s best known writing: John E. Simonett, The Common Law of Morrison 
County, 49 A.B.A.J. 263 (1963).  On the surface, it is a whimsical piece, yet on 
closer reading, it can be seen as expressing his deeply held views on the 
14
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As it turned out, not one of the reasons Spellacy advanced in 
his memorandum—certainly not his sharp break with precedent—
found its way into Simonett’s final opinion; yet, he had seen the 
need for change in this stagnant area of law, and he boldly 
challenged the supreme court to follow him and the Cass County 
jury.  The following year, the Minnesota Supreme Court took only a 
slightly different path to reach the same conclusion that Judge 
Spellacy had: an employer’s handbook may be an “enforceable, 
unilateral modification of a non-union employee’s contract so as to 
permit a fact finder to award damages for wrongful termination.”67 
VI.    THE DECISION IN PINE RIVER 
To appeal Judge Spellacy’s ruling, the Pine River State Bank 
retained one of the premier appellate firms in the state.68  Mettille, 
not surprisingly, stuck with his trial counsel.69  By now it was clear 
that the stakes in this litigation were very large.  In its brief, the 
bank advocated adherence to the at-will rule, citing Skagerberg, 
Cederstrand, and Degen.70  If the appeal was to be decided on the 
basis of stare decisis, the bank would win.  Mettille’s brief cited 
recent law review articles advocating reform of the at-will rule, state 
statutes already limiting the employer’s freedom to discharge, and 
dozens of wrongful discharge decisions from various jurisdictions 
around the country.71  Few times in the supreme court’s history has 
 
importance of the professional mores and customs that complement book-law as 
well as the special place of the law—and the lawyer and the judge—in the 
community. 
 67.  Appellant’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 58, at A-30 (emphasis in 
original). 
 68.  Meagher, Geer, Markham, Anderson, Adamson, Flaskamp & Brennan, 
Minneapolis, joined the bank’s trial counsel, Lundrigan, Hendricks & Lundrigan, 
Pine River, for the appeal.  See Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 624. 
 69.  Throughout the litigation, Mettille was represented by Stephen R. Van 
Drake of Van Drake & Van Drake, Brainerd.  See Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 624. 
 70.  Respondent’s Brief and Appendix at 12–18, Pine River State Bank v. 
Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983) (No. 82-543). 
 71.  A comparison of the citations in the briefs of the two sides shows the stark 
differences in their approach to precedent. 
 
Citations by Source 
 Minnesota Cases Foreign Cases Law Reviews 
Bank 18 11 1 
Mettille 16 70 8 
 
The bank also cited Prosser’s treatise on torts, and Mettille cited Blackstone’s 
Commentaries once. 
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the preference for continuity and stability in the common law 
clashed so openly with its need to change, to stay close to the 
realities of society, as in this appeal. 
John E. Simonett was assigned to write the court’s opinion.  He 
was almost fifty-nine years old at the time.  He had practiced as a 
trial lawyer from 1951 to 1980 in Little Falls in partnership with 
Gordon Rosenmeier, a dominating figure in the Minnesota 
legislature from the 1940s through the 1960s.72  In an interview 
after being appointed to the court in 1980, Simonett described his 
judicial philosophy as “pragmatic.”73  Pine River reflects his 
philosophy of judicial pragmatism. 
An influential opinion is usually well-written.  If such an 
opinion necessarily has substance, the style in which that substance 
is expressed is critical to its success.  Simonett had a distinct style of 
writing.  His discussion of a case sometimes had literary overtones.74  
He seems to have been uncomfortable making the sweeping 
declarations about society, the human condition, and similar 
matters which some judges find irresistible.  At times, his style 
becomes relaxed, even conversational.  He frequently started a 
paragraph, “It appears to us,”75 or “We believe,”76 thus suggesting 
 
 
 72.  Memorial Service for Gordon Rosenmeier on January 21, 1989, in THE  
JUDICIAL CAREER OF JOHN E. SIMONETT  (Marvin Roger Anderson & Susan K. 
Larson, eds.  1998) (Minnesota Justices Series No. 11). 
 73.  Douglas R. Heidenreich, Justice John Simonett, 50 THE HENNEPIN LAW. 9 
(Sept.–Oct. 1980).  Richard Posner has given twelve “generalizations” about “legal 
pragmatism.”  For our purposes, six stand out: “1. Legal pragmatism . . . involves 
consideration of systemic and not just case-specific consequences . . . . 3. The 
ultimate criterion of pragmatic adjudication is reasonableness . . . . 5. Legal 
pragmatism is forward-looking, regarding adherence to past decisions as a 
(qualified) necessity rather than as an ethical duty . . . . 7. Legal pragmatism is 
empiricist . . . . 8. Therefore it is not hostile to all theory . . . . Legal pragmatism is 
hostile to the idea of using abstract moral and political theory to guide judicial 
decisionmaking.  9. The pragmatic judge tends to favor narrow over broad 
grounds of decision in the early stages of the evolution of a legal doctrine.”  
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 59–60 (2003). 
 74.  Several of Simonett’s extra-judicial writings concerned literary aspects of a 
judicial opinion.  See, e.g., John E. Simonett, The Footnote as Excursion and Diversion, 
55 A.B.A.J. 1141 (1969) (praising “exclusionary footnotes” in legal writing); John 
E. Simonett, The Use of the Term ‘Result-Oriented’ to Characterize Appellate Decisions, 10 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 187 (1984) (discussing the positive and negative aspects of 
“result-oriented” judicial decisions). 
 75.  Short v. Sun Newspapers, Inc., 300 N.W.2d 781, 787 (Minn. 1980) 
(dispute over sealed bidding process). 
 76.  In re Petitions of Space Ctr., Inc., 302  N.W.2d 17, 22 (Minn. 1981) (tax 
case). 
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there are other views of the situation.  In Miller v. Shugart,77 a 
famous insurance case, he began the dispositional paragraph by 
asking, “This leaves us with the question of what to do in this 
case.”78  His casual question invited readers—there, hard-nosed 
personal injury lawyers—into the deliberative process.  Of course, 
he knew what should be done with Miller’s case, but only a judge 
with a complete command of insurance law could write like that.79  
The danger of this style of opinion writing is that it reveals the 
highly subjective nature of the job of judging.  Shrewdly, Simonett 
did not follow this style in Pine River. 
Pine River is only nine pages long.  Its statement of the facts is 
about two pages, and it concludes with another two pages fielding 
objections to the trial court’s jury instructions and evidentiary 
rulings.  The legal analysis occupies less than five pages and 
proceeds like chapters in a text book on contract law—offer, 
acceptance, consideration.  The progressive disciplinary 
procedures in an employer’s handbook distributed to its workforce 
are nothing more than an offer, and employees who continue 
working thereby accept that offer and supply consideration.80  The 
at-will rule, Simonett writes, is “only a rule of contract 
construction,” a “presumption” that can be overcome by contrary 
evidence, not a “rule imposing substantive limits to the formation 
of a contract.”81  For Simonett, like Holmes, the repetition of a 
phrase was no substitute for clear thought; reexamining the at-will 
rule, he saw that it still performed an important function in 
employment relations and so he demoted it from a rule of 
substantive law, which it clearly was in earlier decisions of the court, 
to a rebuttable presumption. 
 
 77.  316 N.W.2d 729 (Minn. 1982). 
 78.  Id. at 736. 
 79.  See generally, John E. Simonett, Release of Joint Tortfeasors: Use of the Pierringer 
Release in Minnesota, 3 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1 (1977) (arguing that Minnesota law 
and policy embraced the adoption of the Pierringer release); John E. Simonett & 
David J. Sargent, The Minnesota Plan: A Responsible Alternative to No-Fault Insurance, 
55 MINN. L. REV. 991 (1971) (criticizing the proposed “no fault” legislation in 
Minnesota and advocating reform of the current fault system). 
 80.  Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626–27 (Minn. 1983).  
Simonett reaffirmed that an objective standard determined contract formation.  
Id. at 626.  He avoided discussing whether the parties had a “meeting of the 
minds,” which divided the Michigan Supreme Court in Toussaint.  See id.  For the 
“faulty etymology” of this attractive alliteration, see E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” 
in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L. J. 939, 943–45 (1967). 
 81.  Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 628. 
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In a critical passage, Simonett declares that his court will 
follow a policy of judicial self-restraint—it will not interfere with the 
decision by the employer to restrict its own freedom to act 
arbitrarily: “There is no reason why the at-will presumption needs 
to be construed as a limit on the parties’ freedom to contract.  If 
the parties choose to provide in their employment contract of an 
indefinite duration for provisions of job security, they should be 
able to do so.”82 
Here, Simonett masked the boldness of his ruling in a laissez-
faire cloak.  Crafting it in this subtle fashion, he had no need to 
discuss the origins of the rule or its applicability to modern 
industrial relations, though the four law review articles he cited did 
so.83 
Simonett broke with the status quo, but in a decidedly 
unoriginal way.  His opinion gives the appearance of merely 
applying several traditional contract principles to an everyday 
controversy in the workplace; yet, the final product is innovative 
and fresh.  He did not openly revolt against precedent, as did Judge 
Spellacy; rather than overrule Cederstrand and Degen, he culled 
black-letter principles from both to support his analysis and then 
disingenuously distinguished them by their facts.84  While he cites 
 
 82.  Id.  Toussaint made this same point, though more laboriously.  Toussaint 
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 891 (Mich. 1980).  Aside 
from its rhetorical force, there is considerable irony in this passage from Pine River.  
“Freedom of contract” was once a central feature of laissez-faire capitalism.  Justice 
Sutherland famously said that it was “the general rule and restraint the exception” 
when he struck down the District of Columbia’s minimum wage act in Adkins v. 
Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 546 (1923).  Laid to rest in the constitutional 
revolution of the mid-1930s, this concept suddenly reappears in 1983 in Pine River 
to give workers, usually considered exploited and lacking judicial favor in the old 
regime, new claims of job security against their employers who, we are led to 
believe, have voluntarily chosen to  restrict their own freedom of action. 
 83.  Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting 
the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); Joseph 
DeGuiseppe, Jr., The Effect of the Employment-at-will Rule on Employee Rights to Job 
Security and Fringe Benefits, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (1981); Employment Contracts of 
Unspecified Duration, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 107 (1942); Protecting At Will Employees 
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 
1816 (1980). 
 84.  Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 626–27.  After giving abbreviated versions of the 
facts of these cases, Simonett summed up: “It is clear that the Pine River State 
Bank’s handbook, both with respect to its content and its dissemination, differs 
markedly from the situations in Cederstrand and Degen.” Id. at 627 n. 4.  To the 
contrary, what is clear is that if these cases had arisen post-Pine River, they would 
have survived summary judgment. 
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both Toussaint and Weiner,85 his opinion differs from them in the 
number and breadth of his authorities.  He has a far-ranging 
interest in how other courts and academic scholars were 
approaching the problem of reforming the at-will rule.  In addition 
to law reviews, an ALR, and Restatements,86 he cites twenty-five 
separate cases, some more than once, and they are about evenly 
divided: thirteen are from the Minnesota Supreme Court and 
twelve are from other state and federal courts, all relatively recent 
rulings.  The variety of anchors in Pine River gave it distinct 
advantages over its competition. 
VII.     EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT LITIGATION AFTER PINE RIVER  
Two months before Pine River, the supreme court recognized 
the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress in Hubbard v. 
United Press International.87  Chief Justice Douglas Amdahl’s opinion 
for the court in that matter suggests that the first assault on the 
citadel of the at-will rule may have been successful, in part, because 
it sounded in contract, not tort.88  The result in Hubbard was not 
unexpected; the court had discussed the tort only three years 
earlier.89  But it was a reluctant recognition.  The Chief Justice 
dwelled on the common law’s concern about the authenticity of 
claims of emotional distress that did not accompany a physical 
injury.90  He might have acknowledged the increased ability of 
 
 85. Id. at 629, 631 n.7.  Simonett distinguished Toussaint on its facts: “We do 
not think, however, that Toussaint, which was relied on by respondent and the trial 
court, aids particularly in construing Mettille’s contract.  Id. at 631 n.7.  In 
Toussaint the employees, in accepting employment, had been explicitly assured, 
both orally and in an employer’s manual, that termination would require good 
cause, so that good-cause termination was a negotiated item of the employees’ 
contracts.”  Id.  In dictum, however, the Michigan Supreme Court noted that the 
pre-employment job security assurances were not necessary to its holding: “No pre-
employment negotiations need take place and the parties’ minds need not meet 
on the subject.”  Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892. 
 86. Simonett cited the Restatement (Second) of Agency (1971) once and the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) three times.  Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 
628–30.  He also cited Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule 
That Employer May Discharge At-will Employee For Any Reason, 12 A.L.R.4th 544 
(1982).  Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 630. 
 87. 330 N.W.2d 428, 438 (Minn. 1983). 
 88.  See generally Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d 428 (overturning and dismissing a jury 
verdict for the Plaintiff on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim).  
 89. Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123, 129–30 (Minn. 1980) (Sheran, C.J.). 
 90. Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 437–38.  Needless to say, though a Hennepin 
County jury had found UPI guilty of outrageous conduct, after reviewing the facts, 
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mental health professionals to verify emotional injuries or even 
society’s greater knowledge of mental illness, but he did not.  His 
skepticism has never washed off this tort.  Though adopted over 
two decades ago, recoveries for the tort of outrage in Minnesota 
can be counted on the fingers of one hand.91 
There was no need for Simonett to sound a warning about 
feigned mental anguish allegations in Pine River because in an 
action for breach of contract in Minnesota, as in most states, 
emotional distress damages cannot be recovered.  Nor can punitive 
damages.  Thus, the court limited Mettille’s recovery against the 
bank to his wage loss, offset by the amount of his debt to the bank.92 
If contract litigation met initial success in challenging the at-
will rule, it also was the easiest for employers to defeat in future 
battles.  In Pine River, Simonett gave comfort to employers by 
advising them that they could change their handbooks when 
needed.93  Over time, most of them added a conspicuous 
 
Amdahl concluded that its treatment of Hubbard was not so extreme as to be  
“utterly intolerable to the civilized community,” one of the elements of the tort.  
Id. at 439. 
 91. Cf. Michael K. Steenson, The Anatomy of Emotional Distress Claims in 
Minnesota, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 38–39 (1993) (“Claims for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and defamation are increasingly common in cases 
where the employer discharges an employee or otherwise takes action affecting 
the employee’s job status.  Whether the claim is for defamation or the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, the Minnesota Supreme Court has been reluctant 
to expand tort remedies to supplement the traditional contract remedies available 
to discharged employees.  One of the factors that appears to be at work in cases 
such as Hubbard, even if not explicitly stated, is the desire to avoid that 
expansion.”) (citations omitted). 
 92. “The measure of damages for breach of an employment contract is the 
compensation which an employee who has been wrongfully discharged would 
have received had the contract been carried out according to its terms.”  Pine 
River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 632 (Minn. 1983) (quoting Zeller v. 
Prior Lake Pub. Schs., 259 Minn. 487, 493, 108 N.W.2d 602, 606 (1961)).  The 
court dismissed Mettille’s tort claim for mental distress before trial.  Appellant’s 
Brief and Appendix, supra note 58, at A-25.  Mettille’s final judgment against the 
bank totaled only $24,141.07, plus interest.  Id. at A-22. 
 93. Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 627 (“Unilateral contract modification of the 
employment contract may be a repetitive process.  Language in the handbook 
itself may reserve discretion to the employer in certain matters or reserve the right 
to amend or modify the handbook provisions.”).  In Toussaint, the Michigan 
Supreme Court suggested that an employer may choose not to have any personnel 
policies at all.  See Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 894.  Simonett did not hold out such 
an illusion.  He undoubtedly was aware that this option was closed three years 
earlier in Continental Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1980) (Kelly, J.), 
where the supreme court recognized a claim for sexual harassment under the 
Minnesota Human Rights Act.  The court stated that one means of avoiding 
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss1/6
7. HEDIN - RC - REFORMAT 3.DOC 11/20/2006  3:27:34 PM 
2006] PINE RIVER STATE BANK V. METTILLE  317 
“disclaimer” that declared that the handbook was not a contract, 
that its provisions could be changed, and that employees who 
received it served on an “at-will” basis.  With a few exceptions, 
courts in Minnesota have not enforced a handbook with a 
disclaimer against the employer.  As a result, pure Pine River 
contract suits virtually ceased to exist by the end of the century.94 
The most radical effort after Pine River to use contract 
principles to reform the at-will employment relationship, imposing 
a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in unilateral employment 
contracts, was rejected by the supreme court in Hunt v. IBM Mid 
America Employees Federal Credit Union.95  While unavailable in most 
discharge suits, the covenant exists, sub rosa, in common law benefit 
cases—that is, suits alleging that the employer fired an employee to 
avoid paying some other type of compensation, usually a 
commission.96 
 
liability for workplace harassment was for the employer to disseminate a policy 
prohibiting harassment to its workers.  Id. at 248, 250.  A harassment policy 
typically is placed in an employee handbook. 
 94. Michaelson v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 474 N.W.2d 174, 180 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1991) (citing cases), aff’d mem., 479 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1992).  See also Feges v. 
Perkins Rests., Inc., 483 N.W.2d 701, 708 (Minn. 1992). 
 95. 384 N.W.2d 853, 858–59 (Minn. 1986).  But see Nordling v. N. States 
Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 503 (Minn. 1991) (“This court has not made clear 
whether it recognizes such a cause of action, but there is no need to go into the 
question here.  After a careful review of the record, we conclude as a matter of law 
that no covenant could in any event exist in this case.”).  The question of whether 
the covenant exists in an individually negotiated express employment contract 
remains open in Minnesota (because the typical employee in such a situation is a 
professionally trained and licensed individual in whom the employer has placed 
considerable trust and responsibility, it is likely that the supreme court could read 
the covenant into their particular compact). 
 96. After the Second World War, there were a handful of what may be called 
pre-Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) benefits cases.  These 
were successful contract suits by employees to recover bonuses, severance pay and 
even retirement pay an employer promised them if they satisfied certain 
conditions, but then refused after the employees performed.  These cases held 
that an employer could not renege on such a commitment at its will, and were 
sometimes cited by courts relaxing the at-will rule in the 1980s.  In Minnesota, 
Hartung v. Billmeier, 243 Minn. 148, 66 N.W.2d 784 (1954) (Matson, J.) (enforcing 
employer’s promise of a yearly $100 bonus to employee if he worked at least five 
years), cited in Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 627, falls within this small category, as do 
Holman v. CPT Corp., 457 N.W.2d 740, 744 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (citing Buysee v. 
Paine, Weber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 623 F.2d 1244, 1249 (8th Cir. 1980)) and 
Bratton v. Menard, Inc., 438 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). The most 
famous early case explicitly holding that an employer’s discharge of an employee 
to avoid paying a benefit violated a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is 
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977), which was cited 
by Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 443 n.3 (N.Y. 1982)). 
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If Hunt slammed one door shut, it seemed to open another.  
Holding that the handbook relied upon by Hunt was by itself too 
indefinite to constitute an offer to him,97 the court emphasized that 
he was relying solely on the manual as a basis for his contract 
action.98  Oddly, given this judicial hint, few attempts have been 
made by employees in Minnesota to combine documentation with 
oral representations and a course of conduct by the employer as a 
basis for a contract action.99  The most noteworthy of these cases 
was Martens v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co., where a 
plurality of the state supreme court held that a company’s 
brochures, as well as oral statements by its managers concerning a 
system of compensation and promotion, were too indefinite to 
constitute a contract as a matter of law.100  In striking contrast, most 
 
 97. Hunt v. IBM Mid Am. Employees Fed. Credit Union, 384 N.W.2d 853, 857 
(Minn. 1986). 
 98. Id. at 856–57.  In Pine River, Simonett noted that “[n]ot every utterance of 
an employer is binding.”  333 N.W.2d at 630.  This observation has sometimes 
been quoted by courts when disallowing an employee’s contract claim; however, it 
can also be interpreted as suggesting that in a particular case a multiplicity of 
utterances about job security by the employer will be binding.  There can be little 
doubt that Justice Simonett would have welcomed what became known as the “all 
factors test” for determining the nature of a common law employment contract.  
In his article, The Use of the Term “Result-Oriented” to Characterize Appellate Decisions, 
Simonett noted the century-long trend for appellate courts to decide cases less on 
the basis of general legal principles and more on their individual facts; and as an 
example, he cited the adoption of a “totality of the circumstances” test for warrants 
in criminal cases.  John E. Simonett, The Use of the Term “Result-Oriented” to 
Characterize Appellate Decisions, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 189, 209 nn.66–67 (1984) 
(citations omitted).  As another example, he might have noted his court’s 
redefinition of the “at-will rule” from one of substantive limitation on employer-
employee relations to an evidentiary presumption in Pine River. 
 99. Oral promises of an employer formed binding contracts in Hartung, 243 
Minn. 148, 66 N.W.2d 784, and Maschenik v. Park Nicollet Medical Center, 385 
N.W.2d 362 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (employee told about written grievance 
procedure before hire, but was never given a copy).  The Minnesota Court of 
Appeals has explicitly adopted an “all factors” test when interpreting the 
Minnesota Business Corporation Act, which instructs a court when resolving an 
intra-corporate dispute to “take into consideration the . . . reasonable expectations 
of all shareholders as they exist at the inception and develop during the course of 
the shareholders’ relationship with the corporation and with each other.”  MINN. 
STAT. § 302A.751, subdiv. 3a (2004).  The appeals court has written, “When 
ascertaining the [parties’] intent, trial courts must consider the written and oral 
negotiations of the parties as well as the parties’ situation, the type of employment 
and the particular circumstances of the case.”  Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798, 
803 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).  See also Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1990). 
 100. 616 N.W.2d 732 (Minn. 2000) (Anderson & Gilbert, JJ., dissenting).  For 
the plurality, Justice Edward C. Stringer cited Cederstrand v. Lutheran Brotherhood, 
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other state supreme courts, some of which originally followed the 
lead of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Pine River, have adopted a 
totality of circumstances test for contract formation.101 
In 1991, an appeal came before the supreme court which 
 
263 Minn. 520, 523, 117 N.W.2d 213, 216 (1962), Degen v. Investors Diversified 
Services, Inc., 260 Minn. 424, 425, 428, 110 N.W.2d 863, 864–66 (1961), and dusted 
off the Depression-era Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 197 Minn. 291, 294–95, 266 
N.W. 872, 874 (1936) to prop up his conclusion that the plaintiffs’ suit should be 
dismissed under Rule 12.  Martens, 616 N.W.2d at 741–42.  The plurality’s analysis 
was devoid of the wide-ranging interest in scholarly and foreign authorities that 
was a hallmark of Simonett’s work in Pine River.  Even Justice Gilbert, writing in 
dissent, did not cite authority from beyond Minnesota’s borders for his conclusion 
that the plaintiffs should have the opportunity to engage in discovery to prove an 
agreement “bound up in a myriad of representations spanning some fifty years of 
3M’s history.”  Id. at 753 (Gilbert, J., dissenting). 
 101. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals suggests that the “all factors 
test” is the majority rule.  Adkins v. Inco Alloys Int’l, Inc., 417 S.E.2d 910, 914–15 
(W. Va. 1992) (citing cases).  See also Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 710 
P.2d 1025, 1036–38 (Ariz. 1985) (specific promissory language not essential to 
formation of implied contract; parties’ intent to be discerned from totality of 
statements and actions).  In a case cited favorably in Pine River, the California 
Court of Appeals wrote, “[w]hile oblique language will not, standing alone, be 
sufficient to establish agreement . . . it is appropriate to consider the totality of the 
parties’ relationship . . . .”  Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927 (Ct. 
App. 1981).  See Weiner, 443 N.E.2d at 446 (“In determining whether such a 
presumption [of at-will employment] is overcome here, the trier of the facts will 
have to consider the ‘course of conduct’ of the parties, ‘including their writings’    
. . . and their antecedent negotiations. . . . [I]t is not McGraw’s subjective intent, 
nor ‘any single act, phrase or other expression’ but ‘the totality of all of these, 
given the attendant circumstances, the situation of the parties, and the objectives 
they were striving to attain,’ which will control.” (citations omitted)).  See also 
Wright v. Honda Mfg., Inc., 653 N.E.2d 381, 384 (Ohio 1995) (“[I]t is important 
for the trier of fact to review the history of relations between the employer and 
employee and the ‘facts and circumstances’ surrounding the employment-at-will 
relationship. These ‘facts and circumstances’ include ‘the character of the 
employment, custom, the course of dealing between the parties, company policy, 
or any other fact which may illuminate the question . . . .’  [I]n addition . . . such 
evidence . . . includes . . . that information contained in employee handbooks, oral 
representations made by supervisory personnel that employees have been 
promised job security in exchange for good performance, and written assurances 
reflecting company policy.” (citations omitted)).  See also Berube v. Fashion Ctr., 
Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989) (“[E]mployment contracts should be 
construed to give effect to the intent of the parties.  An implied-in-fact promise is a 
judicial attempt to reach precisely that result.  The conclusion that a promise 
exists may arise from a variety of sources, including the conduct of the parties, 
announced personnel policies, practices of that particular trade or industry, or 
other circumstances which show the existence of such a promise.” (citations 
omitted)).  For some courts, a handbook disclaimer is just one factor among many 
to be considered when deciding whether a contract has been formed.  See, e.g., 
McGinnis v. Honeywell, Inc., 791 P.2d 452, 457 (N.M. 1990); Johnson v. Morton 
Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1005 (Utah 1991) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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permitted Simonett to return to Pine River.  It was the multi-count 
wrongful discharge claim of Gail Nordling, a career in-house 
attorney at an electrical utility, on appeal from summary 
judgment.102  Nordling claimed that when he was discharged, his 
employer violated the procedures in its handbook and engaged in 
reprisal for his objection to what he thought was illegal surveillance 
of other employees, and he further claimed that his supervisor 
tortiously interfered with his employment contract. 103 
Simonett, speaking for the full court, reinstated Nordling’s 
contract and tortious interference claims.104  He took note of the 
transformation of the profession from single practitioners or 
“relatively small partnerships”—not unlike his practice for nearly 
three decades in the firm of Rosenmeier & Simonett—to 
specialized practices and “salaried employment lawyers.” 105  He saw 
that for many purposes Nordling’s employer treated him as a 
salaried worker. 106  He concluded that the common-law rule that a 
lawyer could be fired by a client for any reason and be entitled to 
recover only quantum meruit was out-of-date for a salaried lawyer-
employee. 107  While holding that Nordling could hold his ex-
employer liable for disregarding its progressive disciplinary system 
when it fired him, 108 Simonett was highly sensitive to preserving the 
confidential relations between staff lawyer and employer-client. 109  
A model of appellate writing, Nordling is one of Simonett’s finest 
opinions. 
VIII.    PINE RIVER IN THE COURTS OF MINNESOTA 
Practicing lawyers quickly took advantage of Pine River.  
Initially, there were many suits like Hunt—one count complaints 
alleging that the employer violated the graduated disciplinary 
procedures in its handbook when it fired the plaintiff.  But its 
influence was soon felt in other types of employment litigation—
retaliatory discharge cases, unemployment compensation claims, 
and discrimination suits, among others. 
 
 102. Nordling v. N. States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 500 (Minn. 1991). 
 103. Id. 
 104.  Id. at 499.  
 105. Id. at 501–02. 
 106. Id. at 502. 
 107. See id. 
 108. Id. at 503. 
 109. Id. at 502–03. 
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One measure of a case’s influence is the number of times it is 
cited by other courts. As Daniel A. Farber has written, 
Clearly, a host of extraneous factors can influence the 
number of citations that an opinion receives.  In general, 
however, citation impact is a plausible measure of the 
significance of an opinion, that is, how far it ‘moves’ the 
law.  An opinion that contributes little new information 
about the law will not be very useful to later courts, nor 
will it usually be of much interest to commentators.  Thus 
citation frequency provides at least a rough measure of 
how significantly an opinion changes the law.110 
The following is a tabulation of the number of reported 
decisions citing Pine River between 1983 and 2005 by Minnesota 
appellate courts and by federal courts applying Minnesota law in 
diversity cases or in federal cases with a pendent state contract 
claim.111  Each of these courts turned to Pine River as authority for 

















 110. Daniel A. Farber, Earthquakes and Tremors in Statutory Interpretation: An 
Empirical Study of the Dynamics of Interpretation, 89 MINN. L. REV. 848, 852 (2005). 
 111. Our methodology was quite simple.  We conducted a Westlaw search of 
Pine River, and counted all cases citing Pine River issued by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court, the Minnesota Court of Appeals, United States District Courts for the 
District of Minnesota, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals between 1983 and 
December 31, 2005.  The results appear in the table.  A hard copy of the Westlaw 
tabulation is on file with the William Mitchell Law Review. 
Citations By Minnesota Appellate Courts, Minnesota Federal 
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Gross numbers of citations such as these, however, “are at best 
a crude and rough proxy for measuring influence.”112  Yet, if they 
say something, but not much, about Pine River’s influence, they tell 
a great deal more about the explosion of litigation it ignited.  
During this period, Pine River affected the outcomes of many cases 
that were not reported.  There were rulings in small claims court in 
actions to recover wages or commissions and administrative awards 
on claims for unemployment compensation.113 In the folklore of 
the trial bar and the insurance industry, for every case that is tried, 
nine or more are settled.114 The percentage of settlements is much 
higher in employment law.  This is because the at-will rule, even if 
only a presumption, favors the employer.  Few claims by employees 
are ever placed into suit; most settle pre-suit on a confidential 
basis.115  The number of cases, claims, and situations that were 
influenced by Pine River in any year from 1983 through 2005 in the 
state of Minnesota is closer to thirty times the number of citations 
recorded for that year in this table—and this is a conservative 
estimate. 
The bar graph of citations to Pine River in Minnesota courts 
resembles a ski jump, though a descending roller coaster ride may 
be a more apt metaphor.  In fact, it is typical of the citation 
histories of most significant court rulings.  They are cited most 
frequently soon after they are published, less so over time.  This is 
the process of the “aging” of judicial authorities or the 
“depreciation” of legal capital.116  Yet, while this process may be true 
of cases in general, the question remains as to what causes a 
 
 112. William M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal 
Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 271 (1998). 
 113. In 1984, the Minnesota Court of Appeals, applying Pine River, held that an 
employee who is fired in violation of the disciplinary procedures in the employer’s 
handbook cannot be denied unemployment compensation.  Hoemberg v. Watco 
Publishers, Inc., 343 N.W.2d 676, 678 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).  See also Neubert v. 
St. Mary’s Hosp. & Nursing Ctr. of Detroit Lakes, 365 N.W.2d 780, 782 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1985).  In subsequent years, dozens of similar claims were resolved 
administratively, and not always to the benefit of the claimant. 
 114. HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 66 (1982) (citing 
H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE 
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT (1970)). 
 115. For example, in the two decades after Pine River, many employees were 
able to negotiate confidential severance packages before filing suit by arguing that 
the manner of their discharge violated their employers’ own policies. 
 116. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 262–63 (1976).  Borrowing a phrase from 
nuclear physics, they suggest that a case has a limited “half-life.”  Id. at 259. 
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particular case to lose influence—in other words, are there 
external events, occurring outside the chambers of a judge 
searching for authority for an opinion, which cause a particular 
case to diminish in influence? 
There are several external causes of the waning impact of Pine 
River, as measured by its frequency of citation.  First, employers 
learned to follow their own rules when disciplining and dismissing 
employees.117  Next, they took Simonett’s suggestion and amended 
their manuals to include a broad disclaimer, thus creating a 
defense to a Pine River claim.  They also learned the advantages of 
having a departing worker sign a general release as part of a 
modest severance package.  Finally, state appellate courts applied 
Pine River to a variety of situations in published opinions, thereby 
reducing the uncertainty that unnerves practicing lawyers as they 
endeavor to predict to their clients how a court or agency will rule 
in a particular situation.118  A byproduct of a lawyer’s greater 
certainty of judgment is less litigation—and fewer opportunities for 
later courts to cite Pine River. 
IX.    PINE RIVER AMONG THE STATES 
In 1988, the New Hampshire Supreme Court faced the 
question of the enforceability of an employer’s manual in a 
 
 117. This is related to two other phenomena of the 1980s: the preventive law 
programs of large law firms, which sought to educate corporate clients about 
developments in employment law, and second, continuing legal education courses 
during which practicing lawyers learned the lessons of Pine River and advised their 
clients accordingly.  The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted a policy on 
mandatory minimum CLE credits for practicing lawyers in 1975. 
 118. The Minnesota Supreme Court addressed Pine River issues twice in 1986: 
Hunt v. IBM Mid America Employees Federal Credit Union, 384 N.W.2d 853 (Minn. 
1986), and Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 389 N.W.2d 876, 892–93 (Minn. 
1986) (Simonett, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); once in 1991 in 
Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991), and again in 
1992 in Feges v. Perkins Restaurants., Inc., 483 N.W.2d 701 (Minn. 1992).  The 
appeals court decided a raft of cases in the years immediately following Pine River, 
each incrementally advancing the bar’s understanding: in 1984, Hoemberg, 343 
N.W.2d 676; in 1985, Neubert, 365 N.W.2d 780, and Tobias v. Montgomery Ward & 
Co., 362 N.W.2d 380 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); in 1986, Brookshaw v. South St. Paul 
Feed, Inc., 381 N.W.2d 33 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), Fitzgerald v. Norwest Corp., 382 
N.W.2d 290 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), Maschenik v. Park Nicollet Medical Center, 385 
N.W.2d 362 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), and Kulkay v. Allied Central Stores, Inc., 398 
N.W.2d 573 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); in 1987, Skramstad v. Otter Tail County, 417 
N.W.2d 124 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), and Herron v. Green Tree Acceptance, Inc., 411 
N.W.2d 192 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
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wrongful discharge action.  Writing for the court, Justice David 
Souter surveyed the judicial landscape and concluded: “Judicial 
responses to actions for the enforcement of job security provisions 
contained in handbooks fall into four broad categories.”119 
He cited only one case, Pine River, as exemplifying the first 
category of cases which enforced manuals “if, but only if, they 
satisfy generally applicable standards of unilateral contract 
formation.”120  He placed Toussaint and Woolley v. Hoffmann-La 
Roche, a 1985 decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court, into the 
second category, which recognized the “enforceability of the 
handbook’s statement of policy, but without so clearly requiring 
compliance with unilateral contract rules.”121  The third category 
relied upon a theory of promissory estoppel, while the fourth 
rejected all efforts to modify the at-will rule.122  After holding that a 
manual should be enforced if certain conditions were met, Souter 
concluded: “Our holding is in line with Pine River State Bank v. 
Mettille, not with the arguably interventionistic passages in Woolley v. 
Hoffmann-LaRoche.”123 
Like Souter, many state courts cited both Toussaint and Pine 
River and less frequently Weiner, while holding that the terms of a 
handbook could limit an employer’s right to discharge its 
employees at will. Because of this, bar graphs of the citation 
histories of Toussaint, Weiner, and Pine River will mirror one 
another, with the number of cites to Weiner far less than its 
competitors. The following table lists the number of cases in which 
other state courts (primarily state supreme courts) cited Pine River 
in the United States from 1983 through 2005.124  The total comes to 
125 separate decisions by appellate courts in thirty-six states.125 
 
 119. Panto v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 547 A.2d 260, 266 (N.H. 1988). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. (citing Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 
880, 892 (Mich. 1980) and Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 
1264, 1268 (N.J. 1985)). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 268. 
 124. For our methodology, see supra note 111.  The cases that were tabulated 
for this table appear in a Westlaw search of all cases citing Pine River from 1983 
through December 31, 2005 by courts in states other than Minnesota.  Except for a 
few cites by state trial courts such as the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, all 
cites are from appellate courts in other states.  The tabulations for this graph are 
on file with the William Mitchell Law Review. 
 125. Appellate courts in the following states did not cite Pine River during this 
period: Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
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There are, however, different ways to cite a case.126  It is one 
thing for a case to be one of many in a block of cites supporting a 
proposition, still another for that case to be quoted.  When one 
state supreme court quotes the opinion of another state supreme 
court, that act signifies that the quoted case is particularly 
influential.127  Pine River was widely quoted, and this is a sure sign of 
its influence. 
In 1983, several months after Pine River appeared, the 
Nebraska Supreme Court quoted it with approval: “We agree with 
the reasoning of the Minnesota Supreme Court that [the 
employer’s] argument enlarges the at-will rule to impose 
substantive limits on the formation of contracts.”128  The next year, 
the Arizona Supreme Court quoted Pine River: “We agree with the 
Minnesota Supreme Court that ‘[i]f the parties choose to provide 
in their employment contract of indefinite duration for provisions 
of job security, they should be able to do so.’”129  In a short ruling, 
issued in 1985, the Vermont Supreme Court quoted Pine River’s 
 
Montana, Nevada, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Tennessee.  See supra 
note 124 and accompanying text.  A tabulation of the states whose appellate courts 
have cited Pine River is on file with the William Mitchell Law Review. 
 126. See generally David J. Walsh, On the Meaning and Pattern of Legal Citations: 
Evidence from State Wrongful Discharge Precedent Cases, 31 LAW & SOC. REV. 337      
(1997). 
 127. Id. at 342. 
 128. Morris v. Lutheran Med. Ctr., 340 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Neb. 1983).  Four 
years later, in Johnson v. Panhandle Co-op Ass’n, 408 N.W.2d 261, 266 (Neb. 1987), it 
quoted Pine River at length, concluding, “We agree with the reasoning of the 
Minnesota court.” 
 129. Leikvold v. Valley View Cmty. Hosp., 688 P.2d 170, 173 (Ariz. 1984). 



































Hedin: A Citation History of Pine River State Bank v. Mettille: a Study
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006
7. HEDIN - RC - REFORMAT 3.DOC 11/20/2006  3:27:34 PM 
326 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1 
holding that the “at-will rule . . . is . . . a rule of . . . construction” 
and concurred with its suggestion that a court need not interfere if 
the parties wished to contract limitations of the employer’s ability 
to discharge.130 
In 1987, the Arkansas Supreme Court, while acknowledging 
Toussaint and Pine River,  rebuffed an attempt to hold the employer 
to its promises in its handbook, while a dissent called the majority’s 
strict adherence to the at-will rule “archaic and in need of 
revision.”131  Four years later, the full court reversed course, quoting 
long passages from Pine River, and when the issue rose years later, it 
returned to Pine River, quoting it once more.132  The West Virginia 
Supreme Court quoted Pine River in two cases and cited it in three 
others as it developed this body of law over a period of ten years.133  
The South Dakota Supreme Court quoted the decision of the 
Minnesota Supreme Court in Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 
which in turn was based on Pine River.134 
It is noteworthy that other courts quoted Pine River for a variety 
of propositions.  The Connecticut Supreme Court quoted Pine 
River’s holding that “additional consideration” was but one sign of 
 
 130. Sherman v. Rutland Hosp., Inc., 500 A.2d 230, 232 (Vt. 1985).  Years later, 
in a curious case, the Vermont Supreme Court, after announcing its decision to 
“join the many courts” that have held that a personnel manual may modify an at-
will relationship, string-cited six decisions that included Pine River and Toussaint 
and then inexplicably announced, “We recognize that this holding draws on 
aspects of both unilateral contract formation and promissory estoppel.”  Taylor v. 
Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 652 A.2d 466, 471 (Vt. 1994).  The court then quoted with 
approval a long passage from Toussaint, which it described as “the leading case.” 
Id. 
 131. Gladden v. Ark. Children’s Hosp., 728 S.W.2d 501, 503 (Ark. 1987).  In a 
stinging dissent to this decision, Associate Justice John T. Purtle summarized the 
history of employment relations over the previous century in three sentences: 
“After the abolishment of slavery in 1865 the employment relationship became 
known as ‘master-servant.’  As late as 1968 this Court determined that a ‘servant’ is 
an employee whose physical conduct is subject to the master’s . . . control.  We 
have now elevated the relationship to one of ‘employer-employee.’”  Id. at 505 
(Purtle, J. dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 132. Crain Indus., Inc. v. Cass, 810 S.W.2d 910, 914–15 (Ark. 1991); Sexton 
Law Firm, P.A. v. Milligan, 948 S.W.2d 388, 393–94 (Ark. 1997). 
 133. The West Virginia Supreme Court quoted Pine River in Cook v. Heck’s Inc., 
342 S.E.2d 453, 458–59 (W. Va. 1986) and Adkins v. Inco Alloys International, Inc., 
417 S.E.2d 910, 914 (W. Va. 1992).  It also cited Pine River in Williamson v. Sharvest 
Management Co., 415 S.E.2d 271, 274 (W. Va. 1992), Hogue v. Cecil I. Walker 
Machinery Co., 431 S.E.2d 687, 689 (W. Va. 1993), and Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 
459 S.E.2d 329, 340 (W. Va. 1995). 
 134. Bauer v. Am. Freight Sys., Inc., 422 N.W.2d 435, 438 (S.D. 1988) (quoting 
Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 883 (Minn. 1986)). 
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the parties’ intent, and that the at-will rule is a rule of construction 
of an employment contract, not a substantive requirement.135  The 
Utah Supreme Court cited Pine River’s repudiation of the alleged 
need for “mutuality of obligation” under a contract.136 
The North Dakota Supreme Court initially cited both Pine 
River and Toussaint and did not distinguish their different 
approaches to the problem.  However, as the issues recurred, its 
analyses became more sophisticated, and in the end Pine River 
prevailed over its competitor.  In 1984, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court held for the first time that an employer could be held liable 
for disregarding the dismissal provisions in its personnel manual, 
citing Pine River and Toussaint.137  Four years later, the issue rose 
again.  In a less perfunctory analysis, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court quoted Pine River’s statement that a unilateral contract can 
be changed and the new conditions become part of that contract.138  
It did not cite Toussaint.  In each of the next three cases involving 
unilateral contract issues, the court cited Pine River but not 
Toussaint.139 
To be sure, other state supreme courts quoted Toussaint.  The 
New Jersey Supreme Court cited Pine River140 but quoted Toussaint 
in Woolley.141  This approach was followed by the Alaska Supreme 
Court in a 1989 decision142 and by the New Mexico Supreme Court 
 
 135. Coelho v. Posi-Seal Int’l, Inc., 544 A.2d 170, 175 (Conn. 1988).  On this 
point the Supreme Court of Connecticut noted that “the Minnesota Supreme 
Court adopted the Littell rule.”  Id. (referencing Littell v. Evening Star Newspaper 
Co., 120 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1941), cited in Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 
N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn. 1983)). 
 136. Berube v. Fashion Ctr., Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1045 (Utah 1989) (quoting 
Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 629).  The Berube court also cited Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, 
Inc. for the same proposition.  Id. (citing 443 N.E.2d 441, 444–45 (N.Y. 1982)). 
 137. Hammond v. N.D. State Pers. Bd., 345 N.W.2d 359, 361 (N.D. 1984).  It 
also cited a lower court from Pennsylvania and one of its own decisions from 1972.  
Id. 
 138. Sadler v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 431 N.W.2d 296, 298 (N.D. 1988) 
(quoting 333 N.W.2d at 627). 
 139. Aaland v. Lake Region Grain Co-op., 511 N.W.2d 244, 246 (N.D. 1994); 
Pratt v. Heartview Found., 512 N.W.2d 675, 677 (N.D. 1994); Habeck v. 
MacDonald, 520 N.W.2d 808, 811 (N.D. 1994). 
 140. Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1263 (N.J. 1985) 
(citing Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 628). 
 141. Id. at 1268 (quoting Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 
N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980)). 
 142. Jones v. Cent. Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 786 (Alaska 1989). 
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in 1993.143  Typifying Professor David Walsh’s contention that many 
courts cited cases to “legitimate” or serve as cover for their own 
rulings in a new area of law, the Ohio Court of Appeals quoted 
both Pine River and Toussaint while holding that an employer’s 
promise to pay severance to its employees was binding.144  The 
Wyoming Supreme Court first recognized that a handbook could 
modify the presumptive employment at-will relationship in 1985 
and cited Toussaint.145  When the issue reappeared in 1994, the 
court quoted Toussaint multiple times.146  In 2000, it cited Pine 
River’s repudiation of the mutuality of obligation argument.147  The 
Maryland Court of Special Appeals quoted Pine River on the 
formation of contracts and its admonition that “general statements 
of policy are no more than that and do not meet the contractual 
requirements for an offer”148; however,  it also quoted Toussaint at 
length and described that opinion as having the “best exposition” 
of the view that an employer’s pronouncements may create legally 
enforceable obligations.149 
In his study of the citation practices of state courts in wrongful 
discharge cases, which included contract actions, public policy 
retaliatory discharge cases, and suits involving the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, Professor Walsh saw that very few courts 
explicitly stated that they relied upon the ruling of another court; 
he noticed that when such statements were made, they “tended to 
be scattered about rather than directed at one or a few courts.”150  
However, he found one exception to this pattern: 
 
 143. Hartbarger v. Frank Paxton Co., 857 P.2d 776, 781, 786 (N.M. 1993) (“We 
find the reasoning of Toussaint and similar cases persuasive.”). 
 144. Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 765, 772–73 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).  
Helle was cited with approval by the Ohio Supreme Court when it recognized that 
the at-will doctrine could be modified by implied or express contract.  Mers v. 
Dispatch Printing Co., 483 N.E.2d 150, 154 (Ohio 1985). 
 145. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 707 (Wyo. 1985). 
 146. Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 217–18 
(Wyo. 1994). 
 147. Worley v. Wyo. Bottling Co., 1 P.3d 615, 623 (Wyo. 2000) (citing Pine 
River, 333 N.W.2d at 629). 
 148. Staggs v. Blue Cross of Md., Inc., 486 A.2d 798, 802, 804 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1985). 
 149. Id. at 802.  The court later quoted Pine River again in MacGill v. Blue Cross 
of Maryland, Inc., 551 A.2d 501, 503 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989).  The Maryland 
Supreme Court eventually held that handbooks may constitute a unilateral 
contract and cited both Pine River and Toussaint in its analysis.  Suburban Hosp., 
Inc., v. Dwiggins, 596 A.2d 1069, 1075 (Md. 1991). 
 150. Walsh, supra note 31, at 354. 
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The main exception in this regard is the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, whose decision in Pine River State Bank 
v. Mettille (1983) was cited as particularly influential by all 
of the courts that made such a statement in an implied 
contract precedent case.  Other courts seemed to be 
impressed by the manner in which that decision, while 
adopting a new wrongful discharge doctrine, was firmly 
couched in the familiar discourse of contract law.151 
This is exactly why Justice Souter sided with Pine River in his 
meticulous survey of the case law. 
X.    PINE RIVER IN THE LAW REVIEWS 
Law reviews serve the legal profession in many ways.  They are 
a forum for serious scholarship, commentary, and debate; they 
monitor the activities of the United States Supreme Court 
especially closely, if not obsessively; and they sometimes critique the 
decisions of state supreme courts.  For our purposes, the reviews 
are important for another reason: they are a sensitive barometer of 
judicial innovation.  As in other disciplines, originality, a break with 
the status quo, is noted in professional journals. 
The following chart lists the number of times American law 





 151. Id. at 360 n.17. 
 152. For our methodology, see supra note 111 and accompanying text.  
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From 1983 through 2005, Pine River was cited in 185 separate 
law review articles.  Only one article was a narrow case note in a law 
review published by a law school in Minnesota.153  The rest 
concerned developments in the common law of employment 
contracts in individual jurisdictions as well as a wide range of other 
employment-related subjects.  The sheer number of these articles 
attests to the upheaval in employment relations caused by the 
employee rights movement during this period.  The decade 
spanning the 1990s, when Pine River was cited with consistently high 
frequency, coincides with the emergence of employment law as a 
legal specialty. 
It has been said of Benjamin Cardozo that he “cultivated 
academics.”154  Cardozo cited four times more scholarly articles in 
his opinions than his colleagues on the New York Court of 
Appeals,155 and he wrote three famous books on the law, each 
published by a university press.156  It could never be said that Justice 
Simonett set out to curry favor with academia.  Nevertheless, he 
admired law reviews, and he saw that the bench benefited from 
their critiques.157  He was the President of the Minnesota Law Review 
in the 1950–1951 school year.  In an interview after being 
appointed, he remarked with evident pride about the Minnesota 
Law Review, “Volume 34 is mine.”158  Within a few years after his 
 
 153. Sarah C. Steefel, Note, At-Will Employment--Contractual Limitation of an 
Employer’s Right to Terminate: Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 
(Minn. 1983), 7 HAMLINE L. REV. 463 (1984). 
 154. RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 135 (1990).  
Anyone who reads this insightful book quickly realizes that it contains almost as 
much Posner-on-Posner as Posner-on-Cardozo. 
 155. Id. 
 156. THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 
(1924); and THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE (1928). 
 157. Speech to the University of Minnesota Law Review on April 11, 1986,  in  
THE  JUDICIAL CAREER OF JOHN E. SIMONETT (Marvin Roger Anderson & Susan K. 
Larson, eds., 1998) (Minnesota Justices Series No. 11) (“We need the informed 
criticism and comment of the bar to tell us what we have said and to put our 
opinions in perspective.  Here law reviews are of immense help.  Law reviews 
provide a forum for objective and reflective criticism of appellate decision-making.  
Judges tend to be generalists, and we need the view of scholars and experts in the 
particular field.  Our opinions are bound by the facts of a particular case, and we 
find it helpful for law reviews, which can treat a problem more abstractly, to 
explore the theoretical underpinnings of our rulings.  Knowing that our opinions 
are being written not just for the litigants but for a broader sophisticated audience 
serves as a healthy discipline and, as Lord Bryce observed, helps to keep the courts 
from ‘immersion in the turbid pool of politics.’”). 
 158. Heidenreich, supra note 73, at 9. 
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retirement, he could walk through the stacks of the library of any 
law school and point to hundreds of bound volumes of law reviews 
containing references to his opinions. 
XI.    THE UNEXPECTED AFTERMATH OF PINE RIVER 
What appears incremental in Pine River masked seismic 
change.  Simonett’s reexamination of the at-will employment 
relationship within the parameters of traditional contract law 
encouraged a major attack on the rule a few years later, this one 
sounding in tort.  In 1986, the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
recognized the so-called “public policy exception” to the at-will 
rule.159  The court noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court, 
beginning in Pine River, had created an “implied-in-fact contract 
exception.”160  From there the appeals court easily carved out 
another “exception”—an employee who is fired for refusing to 
break a law has a tort claim for retaliatory discharge.161  The 
legislature quickly enacted a statute on the subject,162 and when this 
 
 159. Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588, 591–93 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1986) (citing Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 334 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1959), among others). The phrase “exception to the at-will rule” was not 
used by Simonett when he discussed unilateral contracts in Pine River; instead, he 
very carefully and pointedly stated that the at-will rule is “only a rule of contract 
construction.”  333 N.W.2d at 628.  The description of Pine River’s contract analysis 
as an “exception to employment at will” first appeared in Lewis v. Equitable Life 
Assurance Society, 389 N.W.2d 876, 882 (Minn. 1986).  The appeals court repeated 
the phrase a few months later in Phipps.  396 N.W.2d at 591.  In the following 
years, Simonett’s pragmatic holding that the at-will rule is only a means of 
interpreting employment contracts is rarely mentioned by Minnesota trial courts 
or the appeals court; instead, the rule, or “doctrine” as it is sometimes labeled, has 
been restored to near-substantive-law status and challenges to it are mechanically 
placed within several firm classifications—promissory estoppel, contract, 
whistleblower, and so on. 
 160. 396 N.W.2d at 590. 
 161. Id. at 593 (“[W]e believe that a public policy exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrine would assist in maintaining the integrity and 
limitations of other causes of action.  Rather than attempting to reach a grievous 
wrong, repugnant to an ordered society, through the artificial expansion of other 
doctrines, it is preferable to recognize it in its individual posture.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 162. MINN. STAT. § 181.932 (2004) (originally enacted as Act of May 11, 1987, 
ch. 76, sec. 2, 1987 Minn. Laws 140 (prohibiting certain terminations)).  
Retaliatory discharge suits against government entities under the Minnesota 
Whistleblower Act frequently include a separate count alleging denial of the 
employee’s First Amendment free speech rights.  See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 
U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
35
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case came before the supreme court, it affirmed that such a 
retaliatory discharge called for tort remedies.163 
From the late 1980s through the end of the next decade, there 
was a tsunami of sexual harassment litigation against all sizes and 
shapes of American businesses.  Many of these civil rights suits 
included common law tort claims such as defamation,164 assault and 
battery,165 and intentional infliction of mental distress.166  In still 
other cases, dismissed employees resurrected tort theories such as 
fraud in the inducement to the contract167 and intentional 
misrepresentation168 and alleged them in workplace litigation that 
would have been summarily dismissed before Pine River.  In 
addition, Pine River, a common law contract action, reaffirmed the 
importance of the employer’s own rules in litigation under civil 
rights legislation.169 
 
 163. Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp, 408 N.W.2d 569, 571 (Minn. 1987) 
(Scott, J.).  The Whistleblower Act confounded the intermediate court for the 
next fifteen years.  Finally in 2002, much of the gloss that had been slathered on 
this legislation was removed by the supreme court in Anderson-Johanningmeier v. 
Mid-Minnesota Women’s Center, Inc., 637 N.W.2d 270, 277 (Minn. 2002) (employee 
who reports suspected violation of law need not prove that law implicates “public 
policy”), and in Abraham v. County of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 354 (Minn. 2002) 
(employees alleging dismissals violated Whistleblower Act and Minnesota 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (MOSHA) were entitled to jury trials and tort 
remedies). 
 164. See Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1990) (sexual 
harassment and defamation).  The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the tort 
of defamation by self-publication in Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 389 
N.W.2d 876, 886–88 (Minn. 1986) (employee recovered for both breach of 
contract and defamation). 
 165. See Johnson v. Ramsey County, 424 N.W.2d 800, 808–10 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1988) (recovery for assault and battery, the statute of limitations for harassment 
under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) having passed). 
 166. In addition, sexual harassment plaintiffs began pleading torts claims such 
as negligent hiring, negligent retention, and negligent supervision, but these have 
not fared well. Compare Timothy P. Glynn, The Limited Viability of Negligent 
Supervision, Retention, Hiring, and Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims in Employment 
Discrimination Cases in Minnesota, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 581 (1998), with  
Richard A. Ross, How Exclusive is the Exclusivity Provision of the Minnesota Human 
Rights Act?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1063 (2000). 
 167. Brooks v. Doherty, Rumble & Butler, 481 N.W.2d 120 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1992). 
 168. Hanks v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 493 N.W.2d  302 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
 169. One of the classic pieces of circumstantial evidence of disparate treatment 
is proof that the employer violated its own policies when it engaged in the 
challenged activity.  The cases discussing this proof are legion.  See Muldrew v. 
Anheuser Busch, 554 F. Supp. 808, 810 (E.D. Mo. 1982), aff’d, 728 F.2d 989 (8th 
Cir. 1984) (arguing that application of a policy different than company’s written 
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Finally, as evidence of the common law’s ability to regenerate, 
the concept of additional consideration that was used by the 
supreme court to give relief to Rev. Bussard170 and that Simonett 
relegated to a “presumption” in construing employment contracts 
in Pine River171 reappeared in an important corner of corporate 
law—involving employment disputes between shareholders of close 
corporations.  In a series of cases the Minnesota Appeals Court has 
interpreted the Minnesota Business Corporation Act to give 
protection to shareholder-employees who invest capital in the new 
enterprise—in other words, provide “additional consideration” to 
their employer—against oppression (i.e., arbitrary discharge) by 
those in control.172  Simonett’s description of the evidentiary 
 
policy is evidence of pretext); Clymore v. Far-Mar-Co., 709 F.2d 499, 503–04 (8th 
Cir. 1983) (finding salary discrimination where plaintiff’s wages were below the 
salary guidelines for her position); EEOC v. Minneapolis Elec. Steel Casting Co., 
552 F. Supp. 957, 964 (D. Minn. 1982) (noting that a failure to uniformly enforce 
unwritten safety policies can be evidence of discriminatory treatment).  The theory 
underlying this proof is that the employee who is not given the benefit of the 
employer’s policies on discharge, promotion, etc., is denied “employment 
opportunities” afforded other employees.  In civil rights litigation where this 
evidence is offered, it is not necessary to prove that the employer’s personnel 
policy in question satisfies Pine River’s high standards for the formation of a 
unilateral contract. 
 170. Bussard v. Coll. of St. Thomas, 294 Minn. 215, 200 N.W.2d 155 (1972). 
 171. 333 N.W.2d 622, 628 (Minn. 1983).  An employee who provides 
additional consideration to the employer is “presumed” to have an employment 
contract terminable for cause.  In such a situation, the burden is on the employer 
to rebut the presumption of heightened job security. 
 172. In determining whether a shareholder-employee had a “reasonable 
expectation” of job security, which is the standard in Minnesota Statutes, section 
302A.751, subdivision 3a (2004)—in other words, whether that employment was 
not terminable at the whim of those controlling the corporation, and whether all 
other shareholders had the same understanding—the appeals court in Haley v. 
Forcelee, 669 N.W.2d 48, 60 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003), listed four factors, the first of 
which was “whether the shareholder made a capital investment in the company.”  
Cf. Gunderson v. Alliance of Computer Prof’ls, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 173, 190 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2001) (“[A]n employee who has no capital investment in the corporation 
but either buys a small percentage of stock through periodic company offerings or 
receives a small percentage of stock as part of a compensation package most likely 
lacks a reasonable expectation of employment.”).  See also Harris v. Mardan Bus. 
Sys. Inc., 421 N.W.2d 350, 353 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming dismissal of an 
employee-shareholder’s wrongful discharge suit and noting that the employee 
received stock as compensation).  In this state, at least since 1896, an employee’s 
investment of capital in the employer has been recognized as a form of “additional 
consideration” sufficient to give that investor-shareholder-employee a job 
terminable only for cause.  McMullan v. Dickinson, 63 Minn. 405, 407–09, 65 N.W. 
661, 662 (1896).  In Pine River, Simonett cited two cases in his analysis of 
additional consideration, and both involved employees who had “invested” in their 
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significance of the old common law concept of “additional 
consideration” in Pine River permeates the law of entrepreneurship 
in the state of Minnesota. 
Similar developments in the law of employment relations—a 
relaxation of the “at-will rule” of contract construction and, 
simultaneously, a willingness by the judiciary to grant new remedies 
for unfairness in the workplace to employees—occurred in every 
state in the nation in the late 1980s and 1990s.  By century’s end, 
the employee rights movement had reached maturity; yet, 
significantly, it had not in any demonstrable manner impaired the 
ability of management to make decisions on allocation of capital, 
restructuring, product development, and every other matter 
necessary to keep the enterprise competitive, efficient, and  
functioning. 
XII.     THE BIRTH OF A NEW DISCIPLINE 
By the end of the 1980s, the outlines of employment law as a 
distinct legal discipline were emerging.  This was part of the 
movement toward specialization in the legal profession that 
Simonett had noted in Nordling, a trend encouraged by the removal 
of ethical restrictions on lawyer advertising. 
Many legal specialties work with one piece of legislation or 
even subparts of an act—the bankruptcy act, the tax code, the 
criminal code, and so on.  While civil rights laws such as Title VII, 
the Equal Pay Act, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
required specialized knowledge, the civil rights bar was too small 
and fragmented to form a separate discipline within the profession 
in the 1960s and 1970s.  This began to change with the erosion of 
the at-will rule in the 1980s, its transformation from a rule of 
substantive law to one of common law contract construction, and 
the recognition in most jurisdictions of the “public policy” tort of 
retaliatory discharge.  And then Congress acted.  With the passage 
of three major pieces of legislation in the early 1990s—the 
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), the 1991 
Amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provided for 
jury trials and expanded remedies for victims of intentional 
discrimination, and finally the Family and Medical Leave Act of 
 
employers, thereby giving them job security: Littell v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 
120 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1941) and Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, Inc., 101 Cal. Rptr. 169 
(Ct. App. 1972).  333 N.W.2d at 629. 
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1993 (FMLA)—employment law as a specialty within the profession 
came into being.173 
Within the profession, lawyers began to identify themselves as 
“employment lawyers.”  Labor law firms that were once pegged as 
“management” or “union” learned they had to provide additional 
services to their clients in the areas of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA), the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA), Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and 
many state employment laws.  In similar fashion, civil rights lawyers 
were quick to expand their services.174  The legal departments of 
large corporations had specialists on employment law who handled 
routine in-house matters and, occasionally, defended litigation 
against their employer-client as well. 
One characteristic of specialties is that they have their own 
professional organizations and honor societies.  In 1976, the 
National Employment Law Institute was formed to educate 
corporate lawyers and managers about Equal Employment 
Opportunity (EEO) matters. 175  It quickly expanded its mission to 
include wage and hour laws, occupational safety, employee 
benefits, wrongful discharge, and compliance with the federal laws 
of the early 1990s. In 1985, the National Employment Lawyers 
 
 173. The evolution of “human resources” into a specialized area of 
management parallels that of employment law.  Employees in this area were once 
known as benefits coordinators.  As such, they handled pension, retirement and 
wage and hour matters; but, in the civil rights era, their duties came to encompass 
EEO compliance, affirmative action duties, sexual harassment training, 
development of reasonable accommodations under the ADA, administration of 
the FMLA, as well as administration of the company’s own internal rules.  As 
professionally trained human resources managers in large corporations, they too 
had their own journals, organizations, continuing education courses, and ethical 
standards.  As with employment law, the roots of human resources, as a profession, 
lie in 1960s civil rights legislation. 
 174. At the beginning of the 1980s, the civil rights bar, an extremely small 
segment of the profession, represented non-union employees in discrimination 
claims against their employers.  Because intentional discrimination is hard to 
prove and less prevalent than many think, they could offer no assistance to most 
potential clients who had been treated arbitrarily or unfairly but not 
discriminatorily.  Thus, when the first cracks in the facade of the at-will rule were 
exposed, these lawyers seized the opportunity and resurrected old common law 
theories and pressed newly recognized ones, frequently in conjunction with 
allegations of discrimination.  Lawyers representing unions did not have similar 
urgings to advance the emerging rights of unorganized workers, though as the 
employee rights movement gained momentum in the early 1990s, they too took on 
many of these cases. 
 175. National Employment Law Institute, http://www.neli.org (last visited Oct. 
12, 2006). 
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Association (NELA) was formed to benefit lawyers representing 
employees in statutory and common-law claims against their 
employers.176  The Minnesota chapter of NELA was formed in 1990.  
An honorary society, The College of Labor and Employment 
Lawyers, headquartered in Washington, D.C., was founded in 1995 
on the 60th anniversary of the National Labor Relations Board and 
the 30th anniversary of Title VII and Executive Order 11246. 177 
Specialties also have their own literature.  The management-
sponsored Employee Relations Law Journal, started in 1975, originally 
dealt with labor, EEO, and pension issues, but it soon encompassed 
developments in wrongful discharge law and newly enacted federal 
legislation.  The Industrial Relations Law Journal, founded in 1976, 
changed its title to Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law in 
1993.  The American Bar Association’s The Labor Lawyer was started 
in 1985; it is sub-headed, “A Journal of Ideas and Developments in 
Labor and Employment Law.”  The Employee Rights and Employment 
Policy Journal, affiliated with the Chicago-Kent College of Law, was 
founded in 1997, and the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labor 
and Employment Law was started the following year. 
Law schools began to teach courses on employment law, and 
they were separate from classes on labor law and employment 
discrimination.  During the 1987–88 school year, Professor 
Deborah Schmedemann taught the first course in employment law 
at William Mitchell College of Law.178  In the fall semester of 1988, 
Professor Stephen F. Befort taught the first class at the University of 
Minnesota Law School.179 
Finally, as the ultimate proof of the emergence of the new 
discipline, a change was made in the hallowed Key-Number System.  
In 2004, Thompson Publishing Company, the successor of West, 
eliminated “Master and Servant” and “Labor Relations” and 
merged them into a new classification: “Labor and Employment.” 
 
 176. NELA was first known as the Plaintiff Employment Lawyers Association.  It 
changed its name in 1990.   
 177. The College of Labor and Employment Lawyers, Inc., http:// 
www.laborandemploymentcollege.org/ (enter the site; then follow “About the 
College” hyperlink)(last visited Oct. 17, 2006).  
 178. WILLIAM MITCHELL COLLEGE OF LAW, BULLETIN/CATALOG 40 (1987). 
 179. E-mail from Stephen F. Befort, Professor of Law, University of Minnesota 
Law School, to Douglas Hedin, Lawyer (July 28, 2006, 12:32:35 CST) (on file with 
author). 
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XIII.   CONCLUSION 
Just as biographers must not identify themselves too closely 
with their subjects, giving them an influence they do not deserve, 
so also should a study of a particular court case not overstate its 
importance.  And so, while Pine River was significant, and that can 
be documented, its influence really derives from being the most 
important member of the trio.  It was the trio—Toussaint, Weiner, 
and Pine River itself—decided separately yet reinforcing one 
another—that launched the first major successful assault on the 
citadel, one that was warmly received by most other state supreme 
courts.  They changed the common law of employment relations in 
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